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 INTERPRETATIONS 
OR INTERVENTIONS? 
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 
IN THE GLOBAL 
COSMOPOLIS  
 Christian   Coseru 
 If the history of philosophy could be told without gaps, where and how would 
Indian philosophy fi t in? And, when all is said and done, what are some of the 
arguments and positions that could be recruited to advance contemporary debates 
in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, logic, philosophy of language, 
ethics, metaethics, moral psychology, political philosophy, aesthetics, and philoso-
phy of religion? Introductions to Indian philosophy seldom engage these questions. 
Instead, they proceed to offer prospective readers an appreciation of the richness 
and real depth of the Indian philosophical tradition in its own terms, and of the 
intellectual rewards that stand to be gained by delving into it. In this sense, intro-
ductions to Indian philosophy differ from introductions to Western philosophy in 
one signifi cant way: the latter typically lack such incentives, given the widespread 
assumption (some might say, prejudice) that Western philosophers have shaped 
not only the way people in the West think about the world today but, in the wake 
of colonialism, people across the planet. If the study of Indian philosophy, then, is 
to have scope beyond the confi nes of intellectual history, questions about its own 
claims and aspirations to truth cannot be ignored. Indeed, such questions concern 
the ongoing relevance of its rich repertoire of methods, views, and arguments, and 
not simply their preservation value. 
 The chapters of this volume make their own case for how particular fi gures and 
texts articulate and seek to answer fundamental questions about the nature of real-
ity and the self, the sources and methods of knowledge, and the norms of moral, 
social, political, religious, and aesthetic conduct relative to specifi c goals. They map 
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the conceptual terrain of a primarily, but by no means exclusively, Sanskritic philo-
sophical culture of similar ancestry and equal breadth and depth to that of China, 
Greece, and the Latin West. The present introduction concerns the place that this 
vast body of literature should occupy in the history of philosophy, and the challenge 
of championing pre- modern modes of inquiry in an era when philosophy, at least in 
the anglophone world and its satellites, has in large measure become a highly special-
ized and technical discipline conceived on the model of the sciences. This challenge 
is particularly acute when philosophical fi gures and texts that are historically and 
culturally distant from us are engaged not only exegetically but also with a view to 
recruiting their topics and arguments for contemporary philosophical debates. 
 Canon, style, and the question of method 
 One way to address the questions raised here is to consider the current standard phil-
osophy curriculum. When students in Kolkata, Hong Kong, and Tokyo are introduced 
to philosophy in philosophy programs, for the most part they end up reading some of 
the same fi gures and works that students in Oxford, Berlin, and New York do: Plato, 
Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, John Stuart Mill, and their infl uential twentieth- and 
twenty- fi rst- century descendants. But in Kolkata a student might also get exposure 
to the works of V ā tsy ā yana, Gan ̇ges %a, and Ragun ā tha  Ś iroman ̣i, and wonder how 
their contributions to, say, epistemic norms or category theory fi t in with contem-
porary debates in epistemology and philosophy of language. Likewise, students in 
Tokyo and Hong Kong might get to read D ō gen and Mozi, and ponder the historical 
roots of paraconsistent logic and rule consequentialism. On the whole, whether it is 
read in Oxford or in Kolkata, philosophy’s Western bias holds sway, which explains 
why calls for expanding the canon to accommodate important sources of philosoph-
ical skill from other cultures have been largely unsuccessful. Cultural chauvinism 
and a devaluation of indigenous knowledge sources are partly to blame. But what 
looms large in the imagination of the great majority of philosophers trained on a 
predominantly Western curriculum, whether in Kolkata or Oxford, is the issue of 
incommensurability. 
 When we see the history of philosophy as a series of dialogues among philosophers 
pursuing unresolved problems by building on the achievements of their acknowledged 
forbears we can understand why voices that are not part of the received canon are hard 
to fi t in. Philosophy – the story goes – is constrained by its own genealogy. Consider the 
student who learns in an epistemology seminar that Gan ̇ges %a, a fourteenth- century 
philosopher from Mithil ā and founder of the so- called ‘new reason’ (Navya- Ny ā ya) 
school, is the author of an infl uential non- semantic theory of truth. By making truth 
statements dependent on the actual occurrence of cognitive events, Gan ̇ges %a is able to 
block such paradoxical statements as the antinomy of the liar (e.g., Epimenides’ para-
dox) that would be commonplace on, say, a Tarski- inspired, semantic conception of 
truth. 1 But to account for Gan ̇ges %a’s philosophical contribution our student would have 
to get acquainted with  pram ā n ̣a - theory – that is, the theory of the means or sources 
of knowledge – and with a centuries- old debate about whether truth is apprehended 
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intrinsically ( svatah ̣) or dependent on extraneous conditions ( paratah ̣), and the impli-
cations of these positions (and their variants) for self- knowledge, testimony, and the 
grounds of certainty. 
 Making sense of Gan ̇ges %a’s theory of truth by gaining a measure of familiarity with 
his own Ny ā ya, M ī m ā m !s ā , and Buddhist interlocutors, then, is a necessary step. But it 
is by no means suffi cient. One must also become acquainted with the distinctive fea-
tures of the Indian philosophical genre. There are four categories of writing that stand 
out: (i) terse formulaic  assertions ( s ū tra ), of an aphorism- like quality, (ii) basic  com-
mentary ( bh ā s ̣ya ), aimed at unpacking the elusive assertions, (iii) main  subcommentary 
( v ā rttika ), extending the scope of various positions within the commentary usually by 
way of revision, and further (iv)  subcommentarial additions ( nibandha ), which continue 
the process of interrogation and revision until all interpretive and argumentative pos-
sibilities have been exhausted. Some subcommentaries are limited in scope either to 
clarifying the syntax of the text and providing more clear alternatives (the  vr dot20tti and 
 vivaran ̣a ) or to elucidating obscure terms (the  t #ī k ā ). 
 Furthermore, the commentarial genre comprises a distinct set of nested state-
ments that begins with ‘the topic’ ( vis ̣aya ) of discussion, followed by the expres-
sion ‘of a doubt’ ( sam !s %aya ), the citing ‘of an opponent’s position’ ( p ū rvapaks ̣a ), 
an affirmation ‘of the decided view’ ( siddh ā nta ), and ending with a statement 
‘of purpose’ ( prayojana ). Lastly, there are several types of relations that obtain 
among the sections of a given commentarial text, all of which aim to ensure 
some form of dialogical unity. A successive section should either serve as a cor-
ollary ( prasan ̇ga ) or as a prerequisite ( upodgh ā ta ) to a prior section, either exhibit 
causal dependence ( hetutva ) on the former or eliminate some potential obstacle 
( avasara ), and either share a common goal ( nirv ā hakaikya ) or act as the causal 
condition ( k ā ryaikya ) of a common outcome. Beyond these structural features 
there are conceptual rules to ensure that proper channels of belief acquisition are 
followed, and that beliefs are produced in the right way. And last, but not least, 
it is paramount that fallacies ( hetv ā bh ā sa ) of reasoning are carefully identified 
and avoided. 
 This cursory acquaintance with the discursive strategies of the commentarial genre 
may signal analytic rigor or a pedantic scholasticism. Either way, it would seem obvi-
ous that engaging Indian philosophy without sharing some of its own presuppositions 
and concerns about the nature of evidence, the proper place of reason, and the aims 
of inquiry, is a remote possibility at best. 2 Most important, the contemporary reader 
looking for the Indian equivalent of a Descartes, Hume, or Kant (or, closer to the pre-
sent age, of a Husserl, Sartre, or Quine) would need to suspend belief about style and 
method and proceed with caution so as not to let assumptions about the ‘natural’ order 
of events get in the way. In India, concerns with the justifi cation of true belief occu-
pied thinkers long before it became fashionable in twentieth- century analytic philoso-
phy with Gettier. And debates about consciousness, intentionality, and self- knowledge 
fl ourished during the exact same period – the second half of the fi rst millennium – 
when philosophy in the West went into progressive decline after the closing of Plato’s 
Academy in 529 CE. 
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 Shifting attitudes toward doctrine 
 The new spirit of rational and scientifi c inquiry that we associate in the West with 
Descartes and the British empiricists may be absent in India prior to the advent of 
British colonial rule in the nineteenth century. 3 But methodical reasoning of an unpre-
cedented degree of sophistications and technicality, as the Navya Ny ā ya literature 
attests, is part of the course. While for the most part still motivated by the need to 
explain and justify scholastic positions, a new attitude of  critical deference to (if not yet 
 distance from) authority, heralds the arrival of a proto- modernity. This new attitude is 
born of the progressive recognition, fi rst, that beliefs justifi ed without any extra- textual 
evidence – as traditions of thought indebted to the M ī m ā m !s ā had considered – could 
be fallible and, second, that causal explanation often trumps appeals to textual coher-
ence and doctrinal consistency. 
 The roots of this new attitude reach deep into the latter part of fi rst millen-
nium. Indeed, from Dharmottara (eighth century) and Ratnak ī rti (eleventh cen-
tury) to Gan ̇ges %a (fourteenth century) and Raghun ā tha (sixteenth century), Indian 
philosophers engaged in lengthy debates about such epistemic notions as ‘defect’ 
( dos ̣a ) and ‘excellence’ ( gun ̣a ). While recognizing the potential fallibility of belief 
they also noted that veridical cognitions could not be based solely on beliefs one 
held intrinsically. However, not all traditions of thought embraced this attitude of 
 critical deference. But those that did – primarily the ‘new reason’ thinkers following 
in the footsteps of Gan ̇ges %a – ended up scrutinizing more carefully the nature and 
sources of belief formation. Rather than placing the burden of epistemic responsi-
bility on the belief itself (and how it is held), these ‘new reason’ thinkers gradually 
shifted the focus to its sources: to how we come to form beliefs in the fi rst place. For 
instance, they reasoned that if it could be understood that mirrors function the way 
that they do because of their refl ective properties, then the belief that mirrors pos-
sess the object refl ected, however mysterious these properties might turn out to be, 
could no longer be justifi ed. If epistemic reliability is a factor of descriptive accur-
acy, then the view that there are such things as brute common- sense facts becomes 
untenable. 
 It is hard to assess how widespread this new attitude toward the scope and aims of 
philosophical inquiry became in pre- colonial India, and several chapters in this vol-
ume seek to tackle this question. What is certain is that a great deal of Indian phil-
osophy, even when directly concerned with the justifi cation of textual, testimonial, or 
experiential issues, is still permeated by tradition- specifi c doctrinal assumptions (some 
of which hinge on the precise number and nature of reliable sources of belief forma-
tion ( pram ā n ̣a ), while others on whether constructive philosophical debate requires 
any such doxastic practices at all). Most emblematic of this hermeneutical approach 
are M ī m ā m !saka thinkers such as Kum ā rila and Prabh ā kara (seventh to eighth cen-
tury), whose primary concern is the interpretation of the Vedas and the justifi cation 
for the observance of Vedic ritual. Kum ā rila in particular is best known for granting 
that language has an inexhaustible and unmatched capacity for expression, and for 
defending a view of the Vedas as repositories of epistemically warranted statements. To 
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claim that cognitions formed on the basis of such statements are inherently justifi ed, 
argues Kum ā rila, is to say that they are the bearers of language’s own self- expressive 
and self- revealing power. 
 Doctrinal assumptions are also at the heart of more robustly metaphysical systems of 
thought concerned with the nature of ultimate reality and the self. When R ā m ā nuja – 
an infl uential twelfth- century philosopher of religion and founder of a qualifi ed non- 
dualist school of thought – claims that Advaita (e.g., ‘nondual’ or lacking in any 
attributes) conceptions of Brahman are logically incoherent, he appeals to the intui-
tions of the Sanskrit grammarians about the category of ‘being’ or ‘existence’ ( sattva ). 
For the grammarians,  sattva serves by defi nition as the locus of generic properties, 
qualities, and actions. Likewise, when Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta (tenth to 
eleventh century) – proponents of a nondualist, but theist, metaphysical system 
within the Kashmir  Ś aiva tradition – put forward a quasi- Sartrean conception of 
the self as the pure and unhindered freedom ( sv ā tantrya ) of consciousness, they 
are responding to Buddhist epistemological efforts, championed by Dharmak ī rti 
(seventh century) and his followers, to reconcile a conception of consciousness as 
inherently self- revealing with the cardinal Buddhist doctrines of momentariness 
and no- self. 
 Confronting the metaphilosophical question 
 As it should be obvious by now, Indian philosophy has its own genealogy and its own 
rich repertoire of intramural debates. The responsible approach, at least according to 
the historian of philosophy, would be to chart its course without constant reference 
to periods and categories in Western philosophy or, worse, outmoded (although still 
popular) Orientalist conceptions of Indian thought as dominated by religious and spir-
itual concerns, and, hence, as not really philosophy by the standards of contemporary 
anglophone philosophy. But the historical approach ignores pragmatic considerations 
about what, in the absence of cultural affi nities, should motivate the study of Indian 
philosophy outside its traditional sphere of infl uence, that is, outside the  gurukula sys-
tem and India’s modern secular universities. After all, acknowledging the presence 
of important sources of philosophical insight in the Indian tradition is not enough 
to motivate contemporary philosophers to engage it, let alone take up the study of 
Sanskrit. 
 Whether we are dealing with claims about language, reality, and the self, or with 
principles of reason and empirical grounding, pragmatic exigencies demand that 
Indian philosophical views face the same sort of scrutiny as all other presuppositions 
of the genre. Indeed, from a metaphilosophical standpoint – that is, from the stand-
point of inquiry into the nature of philosophy – the question “Is the Indian philosoph-
ical genre  philosophy ?” is a perfectly legitimate way to seek clarity about what should 
count as philosophy. 4 But the metaphilosophical question cannot be countenanced, 
if suffi cient care to avoid any one conception of its nature and scope from defi ning 
the genre as a whole has not been taken. Philosophy may well be emblematic of the 
human quest to “understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term 
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hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term.” 5 But that understanding has 
already been shaped by a long history of such enduring attempts. And yet, answer-
ing the metaphilosophical question requires that we bracket historical considerations 
altogether and eschew their normative challenges. Are the moral and metaphysical 
lessons of the  Upanis ̣ads , the  Yoga- s ū tras , and the  Bhagavad- G ī t ā philosophy , in the 
critical sense in which that practice has been retrospectively interpreted and adopted 
in both fourteenth- century India and eighteenth- century Europe? Maybe that is the 
wrong question. Perhaps we should reconsider, with Ludwig Wittgenstein, Pierre 
Hadot, and Martha Nussbaum, whether it would not be more appropriate to ask what 
specifi c  forms of life these texts promote, rather than how  philosophical the seemingly 
insoluble problems they give rise to are. 6 
 Indigenism, comparison, and the cosmopolitan ideal 
 In so far as philosophy in English or the Anglophone culture at large defi nes itself 
against the backdrop of a distinct community of inquiry – nowadays constituted largely 
of professional philosophers – the question whether the Indian philosophical genre 
qualifi es as philosophy cannot be answered without engaging in the type of intellectual 
exercise known as ‘comparative philosophy’. As Bimal Krishna Matilal observed some 
time ago, anyone who seeks “to explain and translate systematically from Indian philo-
sophical writings into a European language will, knowingly or unknowingly, be using 
the method of ‘comparative philosophy’.” 7  Not only explicit attempts to bring Indian 
and Western philosophers in dialogue, but even text- critical approaches to the genre 
fall under this category. Doing Indian philosophy in English also means operating with 
a conceptual vocabulary shaped by the Greek culture of fi rst millennium BCE, the 
scholasticism of the Latin Middle Ages, and the predominantly French, English, and 
German intellectual movements of early modern Europe. Thus, one cannot do Indian 
philosophy without at the same time doing Western philosophy, which means that 
questions about whether the tenets of one tradition can sustain statement in the other 
become paramount. Practitioners of the genre ‘comparative philosophy’ are no stran-
gers to expressing misgivings about comparisons that merely tag theories bearing cer-
tain resemblances. And skeptics who champion various forms of indigenism have gone 
as far as to argue that the adoption of English as a medium for doing Indian philosophy 
has been profoundly alienating, despite invaluable contributions from such infl uential 
early modern Indian philosophers as Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya, Surendranath 
Dasgupta, Mysore Hiriyana, and Anukul Chandra Mukherji. 8 
 Refl ecting on this practice as a philosopher trained in both the Indian and the 
Western, primarily phenomenological, tradition, Jitendranath Mohanty singled out 
the mutually enhancing value of thinking across cultural boundaries, and the promise 
that such enterprise might one day usher a new kind of philosophy that is global in 
scope and outlook. 9 While we are still a long way from fulfi lling that promise, a sort of 
open- ended and non- committal thinking across traditions has taken root among prac-
titioners of what some now call ‘fusion philosophy,’ others ‘cross- cultural philosophy,’ 
but what might be best described as ‘cosmopolitan philosophy.’ 10 This idea is neither 
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new nor particularly revolutionary. When Dign ā ga ( c. fi fth to sixth century) embarks 
on his synthesis of the prevalent epistemological, grammatical, and psychological the-
ories of his day and V ā caspati Mis %ra (tenth century) authors his empathetic and infl u-
ential commentaries on Advaita Ved ā nta, Ny ā ya, and S ā m !khya- Yoga texts, they do 
so as members of a Sanskrit cosmopolis. 11 That cosmopolis endures today among trad-
itionally trained scholars in India and the Indian diaspora. But it functions within, and 
relative to, an all- encompassing and universalizing cosmopolis that we now call the 
global West. Doing Indian philosophy today means operating within a larger horizon 
whose cardinal points of reference are no longer geographical but for the most part 
conceptual and institutional. Academic philosophy in the global West is a cosmopol-
itan phenomenon that mirrors the progress of the sciences in its open- ended practice 
of asking questions and pursuing knowledge. 12 
 If one cannot do Indian philosophy in English without doing comparative philoso-
phy, the question naturally arises: is comparative philosophy  philosophy ? The cosmo-
politan approach is partly motivated by a deep skepticism about the possibility of doing 
philosophy comparatively. If comparative religion is not religion and comparative pol-
itics is not politics, how is comparative philosophy  philosophy ? Answers to this question 
run the gamut from outright rejection of the possibility of meaningful comparisons, 
because of the incommensurability of Indian and Western traditions, to the view that 
the content of these traditions, save for minor stylistic differences, is practically the 
same. Skeptics point out that while doctrinal and spiritual concerns are not uncom-
mon for Western fi gures like Augustine, Aquinas, and Kierkegaard, they are not rep-
resentative of the dominant ideals of discursive rationality and argumentation that 
Western philosophy has inherited from the Greeks. Brushing aside such superfi cial dis-
missals, defenders argue that the most infl uential Indian philosophers (e.g., N ā g ā rjuna, 
Dharmak ī rti, Kum ā rila,  Ś r ī hars ̣a, and Gan ̇ges %a, among others) show as much pen-
chant for rational deliberation and argumentative rigor as Descartes, Hume, Kant, and 
Wittgenstein. 
 Philosophical interventions at the confl uence of cultures 
 So, then:  how is comparative philosophy  philosophy ? Pursuing a similar line of 
inquiry, Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber give an example of the sort of 
interventions in solving long- standing philosophical debates in both India and the 
West that only comparative philosophy is equipped to handle. 13 Take refl exivism – 
the thesis that consciousness consists in conscious mental states being impli-
citly self- aware. In India a group of mainly Buddhist philosophers beginning with 
Dign ā ga and Dharmak ī rti have defended versions of this thesis against Naiy ā yikas, 
who claimed instead that the self- awareness which accompanies each instance of 
cognition is inferred from the effects of that cognition. Where the refl exivist thinks 
that I can know something only to the extent that each instance of cognition is 
inherently self- revealing or self- illuminating, his opponent counters that such cog-
nitive acts as ‘seeing something’ are transparent with regard to their own opera-
tions. If knowing is an act, we are only aware of it indirectly, when refl ection turns 
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within and toward its own operations. We see the tree outside the window, not 
the seeing of that tree. But we can infer that seeing has occurred for someone from 
the tree that is now seen. And yet, to postulate a basis for self- knowledge outside 
the structure of experience, or to locate it solely in the conceptual realm, is to prob-
lematically assume that experience is an emergent property of something that is not 
itself experiential. 
 Readers familiar with contemporary debates in phenomenology and philosophy of 
mind would immediately recognize these positions as versions of conceptualism versus 
non- conceptualism with regard to perceptual content, and of the Higher- Order versus 
First- Order theories of consciousness. Such recognition opens the possibility of inter-
vention, either from the direction of Indian philosophy or, in this particular case, from 
that of contemporary philosophy of mind, in solving long- standing debates in each 
tradition. Examples of such interventions abound in the comparative and cross- cultural 
philosophical literature, often yielding novel ways of tackling long- standing problems. 
Sometimes they also provide effective platforms from which to interrogate Western 
hegemonic forms of language, thought, and morality, and take to task those infl u-
ential philosophers – with Nietzsche as the prototypical  example – most responsible 
for perpetrating a sort of ‘neglect by appropriation’ approach to Indian philosophy. 14  
On this ‘interventionist’ model comparative philosophy is  philosophy  – in the sense of 
an open- ended concern with asking questions and pursuing knowledge. But is it the 
sort of philosophy that showcases, if not the unique features, at least the unique trajec-
tory of Indian philosophy? 
 One worry is that such interventions end up treating Indian philosophy as a sort of 
standing reserve to be mined for interesting or even original statements, with utter dis-
regard for their historical context and signifi cance. We only need look at such “manu-
als of reason” as Moks ̣ā karagupta’s  Tarkabh ā s ̣ā (twelfth century) and Annambhat #t #a’s 
 Tarkasam !graha (seventeenth century) to realize that these worries are misplaced. What 
is distinctive about these indigenous interventions is precisely their systematic effort 
to identify, analyze, and evaluate the basic tenets of each school, often disregarding 
context or attribution, with the aid of various epistemological, methodological, and 
logical techniques. 
 An altogether different sort of worry is that many such interventions are anachron-
istic. Take the example of cutting across historical and cultural boundaries to make 
the case that, say, the twelfth- century Advaitin  Ś r ī hars ̣a rather than Gettier should be 
credited with the Gettier Problem. But a history of philosophy without gaps will have 
to look beyond linear narratives and realize that such juxtapositions are inevitable if 
we are to do justice to the progression of thought. If  Ś r ī hars ̣a is the fi rst to frame and 
illustrate the (Gettier) problem, and the fi rst to venture interesting solutions, then he 
addresses not only the concerns of his twelve- century Naiy ā yika opponents, but also 
those of late twentieth- century analytic epistemology. 
 I have already hinted that chronologies are relative to a given philosophical cul-
ture  and epoch. If ‘classical’ is an apt term for much of the early period of Indian 
philosophy, ‘mediaeval’ is not. There is no break with the past in India similar to 
the onset of the European Middle Ages. Foundational  s ū tras for the S ā m !khya, Yoga, 
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Buddhist, Jaina, C ā rv ā ka, Ny ā ya, Vais %es ̣ika, M ī m ā m !s ā , and Vedanta traditions are 
continuously composed over several centuries beginning around 500 BCE, and the 
commentarial tradition continues well into the middle of the second millennium of 
the Common Era. 15 
 Apart from these worries there is also the objection that this sort of cosmopolitan 
intervention either ignores or glosses over issues of cultural difference and concep-
tual incommensurability. Indian philosophy is host to conceptual, argumentative, and 
experiential strategies that do not map neatly onto Western categories and practices. 
Render classical Indian logic in Western terms, and the  anum ā na system of inference 
ends up being indistinguishable from the Aristotelian syllogism. Retain the original 
format with its distinctive steps and characteristics, and the Indian tradition of debate 
can seem alien and contrived. One response to this objection is predictably straight-
forward: whether one thinks inside or outside the categorical framework of a particu-
lar philosophical tradition or culture, 16 one need not endorse its conceptual schema. 
M ā dhyamika philosophers make good use of the sophisticated categorical frameworks 
of Abhidharma, Ny ā ya, and the Sanskrit grammarians, and yet treat them as ‘worldly 
conventions’ ( lokasam !vr dot20iti ) that do not capture the way things are ultimately. For 
M ā dhyamikas, just as for many contemporary global antirealists, seeking to capture 
the intrinsic order of reality through a categorical framework (be it that of Vais %es ̣ika 
or Aristotle) has to contend with the very notion of an ‘essence’ or ‘intrinsic order’ 
of things. Effective as they may be, such categories are subject to revision. And, if it 
should turn out that there are better ways of knowing and being, it is hard to see how 
pursuing them would not be preferable to the status quo. 
 Sometimes the best way to make progress is not to start anew, by breaking with 
the past, but to consider an alternative course, specifi cally one that philosophy might 
have taken had it been shaped by a different cultural geography. In the West phil-
osophy begins in wonder about the natural world and the reach of reason; in India, 
by contrast, it begins in speculations about the origins, nature, and function of lan-
guage as a vehicle of philosophical insight. While the Pre- Socratics wonder about the 
ultimate principle of things ( arche ) using the vocabulary of nature, Indian philosophers 
beginning with Jaimini (fourth century BCE), Gautama (second century CE), and 
N ā g ā rjuna ( fl .  second century CE) are concerned with fi nding out what the relation 
between words and their referents is ultimately like. Is it a primordial ( autpattika ) rela-
tion, as Jaimini claims? Does it depend on a certain capacity to generate knowledge 
that awareness- episodes ( pram ā ) have, as Gautama stipulates? Or is this relation sim-
ply the result of an illegitimate metaphysical use of language prone to reifi cation, as 
N ā g ā rjuna would have it? As should be obvious to all readers of  Cratylus , such con-
cerns are by no means unique to the Indian philosophical tradition. But in India they 
contribute to the articulation of a sophisticated philosophy of language that does not 
become the norm in the West until the middle of the eighteenth century. 
 If the study of Indian philosophy is to resist retreat into the familiar terrain of trad-
ition and its scholastic proclivities, perhaps a confl uence of perspectives rather than 
their comparison is more methodologically apt. Such confl uence is not without histor-
ical precedent. Contact between India and the Greek world following Alexander the 
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Great’s military campaigns set the stage for a work of Buddhist apologetics (the  Milinda 
Pañha ), and allowed such attitudes as ‘freedom from emotion’ ( apatheia ) and ‘content-
edness’ ( eukolia ) – which Pyrrho is said to have witnessed among the so- called ‘naked 
wise men’ ( gymnosophists ) of India – to inform Hellenistic skepticism. The cosmopol-
itan oasis towns of Bukhara, Samarkand, Kashgar, Khotan, and Kucha served as a land 
bridge between Indian Buddhists and Chinese intellectuals drawn to the philosophy 
of emptiness. Their encounter resulted in a practice of matching Buddhist and Daoist 
concepts ( ko- i fo- chiao ) that, by the fourth century CE, would render core Mah ā y ā na 
Buddhist ideas indistinguishable from the teachings of  Daodejing and  Zhuangzi . And, 
the more tolerant sixteenth- and seventeenth- century Mughal rules of Akbar and Shah 
Jahan made possible D ā r ā Shukoh’s momentous translation project of the Upanis ̣ads, 
exposing Persian and Arabic intelligentsia to the same Sanskrit philosophical lore that 
a century and a half later would end up, via translations from Persian to Latin, on 
Schopenhauer’s desk. 
 Signifi cant as these confl uences are we must not forget that they tell as much 
of a story of admiration as of appropriation, assimilation, and refutation. For 
the anonymous compilers of  Milinda Pañha (‘Questions of Milinda’), the Greek 
philosopher- king Milinda (Menander I) is simply a foil for N ā gasena’s compel-
ling defense of the Buddhist no- self view. Pyrrho, to the extent that we can recon-
struct his views, mainly engages with Democritus, Plato, and the Eleatics. And 
Schopenhauer’s main interlocutor is Kant rather than Y ā jñavalkya, despite his high 
regard for the Upanis ̣ads. 
 As we look to the future of philosophy in the twenty- fi rst century we can only hope 
that a better knowledge of Indian philosophy would result in many and more fruitful 
conversations about knowledge, being, and what there is, and about the proper place 
of reason in the midst of it all. 
 Notes 
 1  See Mohanty ( 1966 ), Matilal ( 1985 ), and Phillips ( 2012 : 87– 91) for detailed treatments of Gan ̇ges %a’s 
theories of truth that also engage contemporary issues in epistemology. 
 2  As I have argued elsewhere (Coseru  2012 : 279), the most important aspect of this intercultural philo-
sophical engagement is not the recognition that there are different approaches to philosophy, but the 
promise that such recognition holds for enhancing, refi ning, and expanding the range of argument and 
possibilities that are available to us. 
 3  Ganeri ( 2012 : 6) argues otherwise, but see Garfi eld ( 2014 ) and Phillips ( 2016 ) for more skeptical views 
about whether the outlook of ‘new reason’ Naiy ā yika like Raghun ā tha is of a piece with that of early 
modern thinkers in Europe. 
 4  Perrett ( 2016 : 3), rightly in my view, notes that as exasperating as this question can be for Indologists 
and historians of Indian philosophy, is it perfectly legitimate if we are to distinguish between ‘descrip-
tive’ and ‘evaluative’ (or ‘normative’) uses of the term ‘philosophy’. By the same token one could ask 
the question: “Is this creative form  art ?” or “Is this writing  literature ?” and conclude that while some-
thing does descriptively fall under the category ‘art’ or ‘literature,’ it may still not belong to the class of 
 good art or literature. 
 5  Sellars ( 1962 : 1). 
 6  See Wittgenstein ( 2001 : 192), Hadot ( 2001 : ch. 1), and Nussbaum ( 1994 : 14). 
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 7  Matilal ( 1971 : 13). 
 8  Daya Krishna went so far as to claim that “anyone who is writing in English is not an Indian philosopher” 
that evolution maps onto periods and movements in Western philosophy are found in Franco ( 2013 ) 
and contributions therein. 
 16  See Frazier ( 2014 : 7) for a plea for thinking with, rather than against, Indian categories inherited from 
the Naiy ā yikas and their followers, and thus “inside the box” rather than outside of it. 
 Delhi :  Motilal Banarsidass , 1990. 
 Mohanty ,  J. N.  1966 .  Gan ̇ges %a’s Theory of Truth, Containing the Text of Gan ̇ges %a’ Pr ā m ā n ̣ya(jñapti)v ā da . 2nd 
rev. ed.  Delhi :  Motilal Banarsidass , 1989. 
 Mohanty ,  J. N.  1992 . “ On Matilal’s Understanding of Indian Philosophy .”  Philosophy East and West 
 42 ( 2 ):  397 – 406 . 
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